China is no threat.(military policy) 
Date: 07-17-1996; Publication: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Author: Wang Hao 


 

 


 A few Western analysts have expressed great concern about "the China threat," especially last spring when tensions over the Taiwan issue peaked. These analysts argue that as China grows more powerful, economically and militarily, it will adopt a policy of expansion, menacing its neighbors. A few others believe that it is inevitable that China will move to fill the power vacuum in the Asia-Pacific region created by the retreat of the superpowers. 

It is true that China is growing stronger. Its economy is soaring- -growing at an average annual rate of 9 percent since reforms were instituted in 1978. That alone would put it in the spotlight. Add to that the fact that China has a population of 1.2 billion and is the world's third largest nation in land area, it seems natural that China WHI be influential in the region and on the world stage., On the other hand, despite these analysts' claims, China is not spending inordinate amounts on its military, nor is it inclined to threaten its neighbors. 

Military spending 

China's military spending is comparatively low. Even if China's military expenditures were double its reported figures--as some Western security specialists claim--its defense budget would still be far lower than those of most developed countries or of Japan, Saudi Arabia, or South Korea, according to The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. China spends less than $12 per capita on defense. India spends $11.7; Japan, $336; the United States, $1,081. And China's spending per soldier is less than that of India, Thailand, or South Korea--China's defense spending per soldier is less than one-thirtieth that of the United States. China's military spending is equally low as a percentage of gross domestic product. Again, even it it were doubled to meet some Western estimates, at 1.26 percent it would still be lower than the percent of GDP spent on defense by Korea, Thailand, or Malaysia. It is well below the average of 3.4 percent. 

China's defense spending remains low, both proportionately and in absolute terms. And although China regards upgrading national defense as one of the goals of modernization, it is unlikely to make a greater investment in its military. According to an official Chinese government "white paper" on defense, issued in November 1995, China "has placed defense spending in a position subordinate to and in the service of overall national economic construction." 

That government report indicated that defense spending increased at an annual rate of 6.22 percent from 1979 through 1994. But the general retail price index grew at an annual rate of 7.7 percent over the same term. 

Army officers received an across-the-board increase in monthly wages in 1994; senior officers received an increase of more than 50 percent. One might argue that most of the increase in defense spending in 1994 was designed to restore living standards for armed services personnel by compensating for price hikes. 

Western critics also complain that Chinese reports of military expenditures are incomplete because they do not include the costs of military research and development, modernization of defense industry, plants and equipment, or the revenues that the army derives from commercial enterprises or weapons sales. However, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which compiles and publishes military spending information, most nations' defense spending reports show a similar pattern: there is a "dearth of desegregated military spending data for most countries." SIPRI itself follows NATO guidelines; it does not regard government investments in military enterprises as defense expenditures. 

This is particularly appropriate in the case of China where, as part of industrial reform, most defense industries no longer "belong" to the military and many are slated for conversion. On July 28, 1995, Hu Ping, a senior researcher from China's Institute for International Strategic Studies, explained in People's Daily: 

"In recent years, orders for military materials have dropped, and quite a number of military enterprises have been running under capacity. The government has to give them financial aid and help them convert to the production of civilian goods. This money should be categorized as expenditures to reform state enterprises, not as national defense funds." 

Like other state enterprises, China's military industrial enterprises practiced a "contract responsibility system," which required them to pay the government both taxes and a portion of their profits. Remaining profits from the production of civilian goods were used mostly to expand production and inerease wages. Hu said that Chinese armies were now withdrawing from most of their civilian businesses, with the exception of traditional farming and some sideline production. 

Counting receipts from weapon sales abroad would not change the picture much, either. Alfred Wilhelm, executive vice president of the Atlantic Council, testified before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on October 11, 1995, saying: "Arms sales by defense- related corporations are commonly viewed outside China as a major source of income. However, most major weapons manufactures are not owned or operated by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), but by one of the civilian ministries. The proceeds from most foreign arms sales go to the originating ministry and not the PLA. 

"Furthermore, a review of arms, sales from 1985-92 shows that China' s arms sales averaged little more than $1.5 billion a year. Even if the entire amount were profit and all went to the PLA, the addition to the military coffers would be minimal. According to the Chinese government, at least one-third of state-owned enterprises are operating at a loss and only one-third are breaking even. Arms industries are all state-owned and like the rest many are unprofitable, and all are attempting to convert their excess capacity to civilian production. Of those making a profit, at least half of the profits are being reinvested in defense conversion or modernization as part of the state's massive effort to create new jobs." 

Meeting needs 

China has realistic defense needs. China's borders, which it shares with 15 countries, extend for more than 22,000 kilometers. As security expert Harry Harding, quoted by Gerald Segal in Defending China, points out: "Few other major powers have felt as threatened, for such a long period of time, and by such powerful adversaries, as China has." For the past 46 years, especially during the Cold War era, the country faced direct threats to its security from almost all directions. 

China has built up its military forces over the past four decades. Despite the size of its forces, China's limited economy and relative isolation have meant that the quality of its armaments is relatively low. China's military research and development is generally believed to be at least 15 years behind the West. Although China has tried to import better equipment, it takes considerable time to digest advanced weaponry. Western policies that restrict technology transfer have also made it difficult for China to modernize its military. Although China's military strength is now--and will remain in future--on a level that meets defensive needs, China is not in a position to adopt an expansionist policy or pose a threat to Asia-Pacific stability. 

China's strategic perceptions can be best understood by reviewing the military thinking of Deng Xiaoping, the designer of China's reform and opening. For a long period of time following its founding, the People's Republic was subject to isolation, blockade, and subversion. As a result, the nation was often on alert, preparing for an "early, massive, and even nuclear world war." But in the mid-1980s, Deng concluded that war was not inevitable and that it was possible to realize a long-standing peace. In November 1984, Deng told a meeting of the Central Military Commission: "We should make a real sober-minded judgment ... [which] will keep our mind on economic construction .... We do not have to spend more money on military spending, so we can spare more money for economic construction. We should make up our mind now." Within the year the Central Military Commission issued new guidelines, moving from preparing against the threat of invasion to peacetime constraction. Simultaneously, the commission reduced the military by one million men. A move of this scale--made even before the Cold War was over--is a rare example of contemporary arms control and disarmament. Since 1986 the army has been reduced from 4.25 million to 3.2 million men, a decrease of more than 24 percent, and the defense industry has been gradually transformed from a monolithic producer of military products to a diversified producer of both military and civilian products. 

China's decision in the 1990s to establish diplomatic ties with South Korea and Israel, moves that would have been unthinkable in the past, are also reflections of changing perceptions. The country has played an important role in alleviating tension on the Korean peninsula. 

In the past 15 years, China has integrated itself into the international trade and financial communities. It is a member of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and it is applying for membership in the World Trade Organization. According to World Bank statistics, China's imports and exports accounted for about 30 percent of gross national product in the 1990s, up from about 10 percent in 1978. China is now a full participant in the global and regional political, economic, and security arenas. 

China's modernization requires a peaceful international environment, and China opposes the threat or use of force to settle international disputes. 

Last October, Russia and China reportedly settled their long-running border dispute by demarcating the last 54 contested kilometers along their 4,380-kilometer border. China and India have also reached a peaceful agreement, and border problems with Vietnam are nearly resolved. At a meeting in Shanghai in late April, China and four of its neighbors- -Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajildstan--signed a confidence- building agreement specifying notification and sharply limiting the scale, scope, and number of border-area rnilitary exercises. 

Apart from questions on the ultimate disposition of Taiwan and the governance of Hong Kong, which China regards as internal concerns, the only outstanding dispute between China and other Southeast Asian countries concerns the ownership of the Nansha (Spratlys) Islands. There are four other claimants: Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. But all sides have behaved with restraint. In August 1995, China and the Philippines held talks in Manila that concluded with a code of conduct. Both sides vowed to refrain from force or the threat of force to resolve the dispute. 

China's relations with its neighbors are the best they have been since the People's Republic was founded. As China's senior military scholar Xu Xiaojun said at a 1994 symposium in Beijing, "China enjoys the [best] security environment since 1949. It is not facing any real military threats. There is no obvious danger of a major attack ... [and] there is not a single country in its neighboring or surrounding area that China defines as an antagonist." 

The future 

It is only 16 years since China opened itself to the outside world and began its drive for reform. When a new but rising power enters the international arena, it is crucial to build an environment of trust and to correct misperceptions. 

In terms of both its capabilities and its intentions, China is not a threat to its neighbors in the Asia-pacific region. There is no doubt that China intends to achieve influence through economic rather than military power' China regards the fall of the Soviet Union as a powerful object lesson--no matter how powerful a country's military, it will not last long without a strong economy. 

Any country of the size and population of China will cause concern among its neighbors. Compared to the forces of powers like the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, China's military is weak. But it is a giant in Asia. 

China still remains something of a mystery to other countries, and Western analysts believe that China should increase its transparency on strategic doctrine, intentions, and military spending. Last fall' s publication of a major white paper on defense was a significant move in that regard. 

In Asia, economic prosperity has paved the way for regional economic cooperation. Continued economic growth will require greater cooperation, including agreements in the seculity area. This may not necessarily lead to the establishment of a European Union-style organization, but there is a move toward a multilateral mechanism for dialogue. Chinese Foreign Minister Zian Zichen took part in the July 1993 inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore. 

The best way to make a friend is to treat someone like a friend. This is also true in international relations. China and its Asia-Pacific neighbors have every reason to remain mutually trusted and understood. It is vital for them to view each other as partners, not enemies. Confrontation serves no one's interest. 

Wang Hao, China is no threat.(military policy). Vol. 52, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 07-17-1996, pp 19(3).